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Abstract 
z faff 
)J6, 
The stable marriage problem is a matching problem that pairs members of two · 
sets. The objective is to achieve a matching that satisfies all participants based on 
their preferences. The stable roommate problem is a variant involving only one set, 
which is partitioned into pairs with a similar objective. There exist. asymptotically 
optimal algorithms that solve both problems. 
In this paper, we investigate the complexity of three dimensional extensions of these 
problems. This is one of twelve research directions suggested by Knuth in his book 
on the stable marriage problem. We show that these problems are NP-complete, 
and hence it is unlikely that there exist efficient algorithms for their solutions. 
Applying the polynomial transformation developed in this paper, we extend the 
NP-completeness result to include the problem of matching couples-who are both 
medical school graduates-to pairs of hospital resident positions. This problem is 
important in practice and is dealt with annually by NRMP, the centralized program 
that matches all medical school graduates in the United States to available resident 
positions. 
Notice: This Material 
may be protected 
by Copyright Law 
(Title 17 U.S.C.) 
Complexity of the Stable Marriage 
and Stable Roommate Problems in Three Dimensions 
Introduction 
Consider the problem of assigning 3n students to n disjoint work groups of three 
students each. The students must guard against any three individuals abandoning 
their assignments and instead conspiring to form a new group that they consider 
more desirable. 
The following procedure is followed: each student ranks all (3n-1 )(3n-2) possible 
pairs of fellow students according to her preference for working with the pairs. A 
destabilizing triple for an assignment M consists of three students such that each 
ranks the remaining two (as a pair) more desirable than the pair that she is assigned 
to in M. The students' task, the 3-person stable assignment problem (or 3PSA for 
short), is to find a stable assignment, one that is free of all destabilizing triples, if 
such an assignment exists. 
Readers will recognize that 3PSA is a three dimensional generalization of the stab.le 
roommate problem, which partitions 2n persons into n pairs of stable roommates. 
A better known variation is the stable marriage problem, which divides the par-
ticipants into two disjoint sets, male and female. Each pair in a· stable marriage 
must include a male and a female. The stable marriage problem has a similar 
generalization in three dimensions, which we name the 3-gender stable marriage 
problem (or 3GSM for short) and define in the next section. 
The stable roommate and stable marriage problems have been studied extensively. 
There exist efficient algorithms for both problems that run in 0( n 2) time [GS62] 
[MW71] [IR85]. Ng and Hirschberg have obtained lower bound results proving 
that these algorithms are asymptotically optimal [NH88]. Since no significant 
improvement is possible on the original problems, it is then natural to consider their 
three dimensional generalizations, 3GSM and 3PSA. This is one of twelve research 
directions suggested by Knuth in his treatise on the stable marriage problem 
[KN76]. 
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In this paper, we show that both 3GSM and 3PSA are NP-complete. Hence, it is 
unlikely that fast algorithms exist for these problems. We then apply techniques 
developed in the proofs to two problems dealing with the task of matching mar-
ried couples to jobs, showing that these problems are also NP-complete. Before 
proceeding, we first give some preliminary definitions. 
Definitions 
An instance of 3GSM involves three finite sets A, B, and D. These sets have equal 
cardinality k, which is the size of the problem instance. A marriage in 3GSM is a 
complete matching of the three sets, i.e., a subset of Ax B x D with cardinality k 
such that each element of A, B, and D appears exactly once. 
For each element a of A, we define its preference, denoted by ~a, to be a linear 
order on the elements of B x D. The intuitive meaning of (/31, 81) ~a (/32, 82) is 
that a prefers (/31, 81) to (/32, 82) in a marriage. for b E B and d E D, there are 
also analogous definitions ~b and ~d on the Cartesian products A x D and A x B 
respectively. When the subscript in the relation is evident from context, we omit 
it from the ~ notation. 
A marriage is unstable if there exists a triplet E Ax Bx D such that tis not in the 
marriage and each component oft prefers the pair that it is matched with int to the 
pair that it is matched with in the actual marriage. A stable marriage is a marria~e 
where no such destabilizing triple can be found. Formally, a stable marriage is a 
marriage M, such that, V(a, b, d) ¢ M and for the triples (a, /31, 81), (a2, b, 82), 
(a3,j33,d) EM; either (/31,81) ~a (b,d), (a2,82) ~b (a,d), or (a3,j33) ~d (a,b). 
A 3PSA instance of size n involves a set S of cardinality n = 3k, where k is an 
integer. The preference of s E S, denoted ~8 , is a linear order on the set of 
unordered pairs { ( s1, s2) I s1 =f=. s2 and s1, s2 E S - { s} } . A stable assignment M 
in 3PSA is a partition of S into k disjoint triplet subsets, such that, V { s1, s2, s3} ¢ 
M and for the subsets {si, 0-11, 0-12}, {s2, o-2i, 0-22}, {s3, 0-31, 0-32} E M; either 
(0-11,0-12) ~s1 (s2,s3), (0-21,0-22) ~s2 (s1,s3), or (0-31,0-32) ~s3 (si,s2). 
When referring to preferences, we adopt the convention that items are listed in 
decreasing order of favor. For example, the listing Pl P2 ... Pki where each Pi 
denotes a pair, represents the preference Pl ~ P2 ~ · · · ~ Pk. We also use the 
simpler notation xyz to denote the triple (x, y, z) and xy to denote the pair (x, y). 
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. Although 3GSM is similar to its 2-gender counterpart in that an instance can have 
more than one stable marriage, 1 it differs from the 2-gender counterpart in that 
there exist instances that have no stable marriage. Figure 1 shows a 3GSM instance 
with A= {ai,a2}, B = {/3i,/32} and D = {81,82}. A complete list of all possible 
marriages, each shown with a corresponding destabilizing triple, confirms that no 
stable marriage exists for this instance of 3GSM. 
cq /3182 /3181 /3282 /3281 
a2 /3282 /3181 /3281 /3182 
/31 a281 a182 a181 a282 
/32 a281 a181 a282 a182 
81 al/32 al/31 a2f31 a2/32 
82 al/31 a2/32 al/32 a2/31 
Possible Marriage Destabilizing Triple 
{ alf318i, a2f3282} al/3182 
{ atfh 82, a2f3281} a2f3181 
{ alf328i, a2f3182} al/3182 
{ al/3282, a2f318i} a2f3282 
Figure 1. An instance of 3GSM that has no stable marriage. 
NP-Completeness of JGSM 
In the previous section, we noted that some instances of 3GSM do not have stable 
marriages. In this section, we will show that deciding whether a given instance 
of 3GSM has a stable marriage is an NP-complete problem. This is accomplished 
by giving a polynomial transformation from the 3-dimensional matching problem 
(or 3DM for short) to 3GSM. A proof that 3DM is NP-complete is first given in 
Karp's [KA 72] landmark paper. 
An instance of 3DM involves three finite sets of equal cardinality-which we denote 
by A', B', and D', relating them to A, B, and D of 3GSM. Given a set of 
triples T' ~A' x B' x D', the 3DM problem is to decide if there exists an M' ~ T' 
1 In fact, the number of stable marriages in many instances is exponential in the instances' size. 
Irving and Leather [1186] give a proof of this for the 2-gender case. Extending the proof to cover 
the 3-gender case is straightforward. 
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such that M' is a complete matching, i.e., each element of A', B', and D' appears 
exactly once in J.111 • 
Given a 3DM instance I', we construct a corresponding 3GSM instance I. Although 
our construction can be adapted to work for any 3DM instance in general; we shall 
assume, in order to simplify the presentation, that no element of A', B', or D' 
appears in more than three triples of T'. This assumption is made without loss 
of generality. In their reference work on NP-completeness, Garey and Johnson 
[GJ79, p 221] mention that 3DM remains NP-complete with this restriction. 
We construct I by first building a "frame" consisting of the elements a1, a2 E A, 
/31, /32 E B, and 81, 82 E D. The preferences of these elements do not depend on the 
structure of I' and are displayed in Figure 2. In Figure 2 and subsequent figures, 
w~ are only interested in the roles played by a few items in each preference list. 
Therefore, we use the notation IlRem to denote any fixed but arbitrary permutation 
of the remaining items. 
a1 /3181 /3281 /3182 TI Rem 
a2 /3282 TI Rem 
/31 a182 TI Rem 
/32 a282 a181 TI Rem 
81 a1/32 TI Rem 
82 a1/31 a2/32 TI Rem 
One property of the frame we prove later in Lemma 2 is that the triples a1 /3181 and 
a2f3282 must be included in any stable marriage. Note that a1f3181 is the weakest 
link in such a marriage because it represents the least preferred match for both 
/31 and 81. Consequently, if any element a EA is matched in marriage with a pair 
that it prefers less than /3181, then a/3181 becomes a destabilizing triple. 
The above observation gives us a strategy that uses the pair /3181 as a "boundary" 
in the preferences of A's remaining elements. A necessary condition for a stable 
marriage in I is that all remaining elements of A must match with a pair located 
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left of the boundary, i.e., ~ /Ji 81. Using information from T' to construct the 
set of items to be positioned left of the boundary, we ensure that this condition 
for stable marriage can be met only if T' contains a complete matching. The 
remaining difficulty is to erisure that matching all elements of A left of the boundary 
is sufficient to yield a stable marriage. Before giving details of the construction 
that provides the solution, we first prove the lemmas that establish the frame's 
properties. 
Lemma 1: 
If a stable marriage M exists for I constructed by extending the frame in Figure 2, 
then a1f3281 t/. M. 
Proof: By contradiction. Suppose a1f3281 E M. Since a1f3281 E M, 82's match 
cannot be a1f31 or a2f32. From 82's preference, a1f31 is the only pair ~82 a2f32. 
Therefore, a2f32 ~82 82 's match in M. Moreover, (3282 and a282 are the first 
preference choices of a2 and f32 respectively. Hence, a2f3282 is a destabilizing triple 
for M, a contradiction. I 
Lemma 2: 
If a stable marriage M exists for I constructed by extending the frame in Figure 2, 
then a1f3181 ENI and a2f3282 EM. 
Proof: We first prove a1f3181 E M. Suppose f31 is not matched with a181 in M, 
we can then find a destabilizing triple for M. There are two cases: 
Case 1: f31 is matched with a182. a1f3182 E M implies that a2f3282, a1f3181, 
and a1/3281 </. M. By an argument similar to that of Lemma 1, a1f3281 is 
a destabilizing triple. 
Case 2: (31 is not matched with a182 nor a181. a1f3281 </. M by Lemma 1. a1f3181 
is also </. M, which implies that a1f3182 is a destabilizing triple in this 
case. 
Hence, we conclude that a1f3181 E M, which implies that a1f3182 t/. M. It is now 
easy to verify that if a2f3282 <f. M, then it is a destabilizing triple. I 
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If the sets of I' (A', B', and D') each has k elements, then the sets of I (A, B, 
and D) each has 3k + 2 elements. The a's, (3's, or o's, which are in the frame, 
account for two elements. The remaining 3k elements are defined as follows. 
Suppose A'= {a1,a2, ... ,ak}, B' = {bi,b2, ... ,bk}, and D' = {d1,d2, ... ,dk}· 
According to an earlier assumption, each element ai E A' appears in no more than 
three triples of T'. We clone three copies of ai and replace ai with the clones 
ai[l], ai[2], and ai[3] in A. These clones' preferences are set up to make it possible 
for exactly one of their matches in a stable marriage to correspond to a triple 
in T'. 
To prevent the two remaining clones from interfering with the above setup, we 
add elements wa, ,ya, to B and Xai ,zai to D. In a stable marriage, the pairs 
Waixa, and YaiZai are required to match with two of ai'S clones, putting them 
out of action. We complete the sets B and D by adding to them the elements of 
B' and D' respectively. To summarize, A= {a1,a2} U UaiEA'{ai[lJ,ai[2],ai[3]}, 
B = B' U {(3i,(32} U UaiEA'{WanYaJ, and D = D' U {81,82} U UaiEA'{xai,zaJ· 
The preferences that achieve our objectives are shown in Figure 3. In this partic-
ular instance, we have assumed that aibj1 d1i, aib)2d'2, and aib)Jdfa are the triples 
containing ai in T'. When there exists fewer than three such triples, we equate two 
or more of the j's and l's. 
The following lemma establishes the roles of Wai, Xai, Yai and Zai. 
Lemma 3: 
If a stable marriage M exists for I constructed with the preferences shown in 
Figure 3, then for every ai E A', there exists ji, )2 E {1, 2, 3},· Ji f:. )2 such that 
Proof: Consider the triple ai [1] Wai Xai, which represents the third preference 
choice of Xai and the first preference ~hoices of ai [1] and Wai. It becomes a desta-
bilizing triple unless iai is matched with one of its first three preference choices, 
proving part (a) of the lemma. 
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0:1 
0:2 
ai [1] I WaiXai YaiZai bj1 d1i /3181 II Rem 
ai [2] I WaiXai YaiZai b12d12 /3181 II Rem 
ai [3] I WaiXai YaiZai b)3 d13 /3181 II Rem 
/31 
/32 
Wai ai[l]xai ai [2] Xai ai [3] Xai II Rem 
Yaj ai[l] Zai ai[2] Zai ai [3] Zai II Rem 
bi II Rem 
81 
82 
Xai ai[3] Wai ai [2] Wai ai[l] Wai II Rem 
Zai ai [3] Yai ai[2] Yai ai[l] Yai II Rem 
di II Rem 
Figure 3. Preferences in the 3GSM instance I. The column of /3181 's 
represents the boundary. Preferences of a's, j3's, and 8's are those shown 
in Figure 2. 
Similarly, Zai must be matched with one of its first three preference choices. 
Otherwise, YaiZai forms a destabilizing triple with ai[l] or ai[2], depending on which 
ai clone is matched in part (a). I 
We are now ready to prove the NP-completeness of 3GSM by showing that I has 
a stable marriage if and only if T' has a complete matching of I'. 
Theorem 1: 
If T' contains a complete matching M' of the 3DM instance I', then the constructed 
3GSM instance I has a stable marriage M. 
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Proof." We show that it is possible to construct a stable marriage M. Begin by 
adding a1f3181 and a2/3282 to M. 
For each element ai E A', the only triples in T' containing ai are aibj1 d1i, aib)2d12 , 
and aibj3 dz3 using the notations found in Figure 3. One of these triples is in M'. {a; [1] bji d1,, ai[2] Wai Xai, and ai[3] Yai Zai if aibJi d1i E M'; 
Add to M ai[l] WaiXai, ai[2] bj2 d12 , and ai[3] Yai Zai if aibh d12 E M'; 
ai[l] WaiXai, ai[2] Yai Zai, and ai[3] bj3 d13 if aibh dz3 E lvl'. 
Since M' is a complete matching, the above construction guarantees that those 
elements of B and D that originate from B' and D' are used exactly once in M. It 
is easy to verify that all other elements of A, B, and D are also used exactly once. 
Hence, M is a marriage. 
To show that Mis stable, it is sufficient to show that no element of A is a component 
of a destabilizing triple. a1 and a2 satisfy this condition immediately because they 
are matched with their first preference choices. 
Referring to Figure 3, each of the remaining elements of A is matched with a pair 
located left of the boundary. Hence, the only pairs that can form destabilizing 
triples are Wai Xai and Yai Zai. However, Wai 's (Yai 's) match is one of its first three 
preference choices. These three choices are in exact reverse order of Xai 's ( Zai '~). 
This eliminates Wai and Yai from participating in any destabilizing triple. I 
Theorem 2: 
If the 3GSM instance I has a stable marriage, then T' contains a complete matching 
of the 3DM instance I'. 
Proof: Suppose I has a stable marriage M. Lemma 2 requires M to include 
a1f3181 and a2/3282. Lemma 3 requires that, for each ai E A', two of the ai clones 
match with WaiXai and YaiZai· Let M' represent the matching that results when M 
is restricted to the remaining elements that are without predetermined matches. 
For each ai E A', only one ai clone remains to be matched in M'. Therefore, we 
shall drop the distinction between an ai clone and the ai it represents, without the 
risk of introducing any ambiguity in M'. The elements that participate in M' can 
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then be characterized as exactly those elements of A', B', and D'. Since M' is a 
subset of a marriage, it represents a complete matching. 
Due to the absence of destabilizing triples, every ai in M' must match with a 
preference choice located left of the boundary. The construction of I, as illustrated 
in Figure 3, restricts this choice to the third item in the preference list since the 
first two items are already matched. Moreover, the triple formed by ai and this 
item is contained in T'. Hence, every triple in M' is also a triple in T' and M' is 
the desired complete matching contained in T'. I 
Theorem 3: 
3GSM is NP-complete. 
Proof: It is easy to verify that the construction of I from I' can be accomplished 
within a polynomial time bound. Therefore, Theorems 1 and 2 establish that 
3GSM is NP-hard. It is also possible to check the stability of a given marriage in 
polynomial time, establishing 3GSM's membership in NP. I 
NP-Completeness of JPSA 
The NP-completeness of 3PSA follows from that of 3GSM because the former is a 
generalization of the latter. Given a 3GSM instance I where A= {a1, a2, ... , ak}, 
B = {b1, b2, ... , bk}, and D = {di, d2, ... , dk}; we can extend it into a 3PSA 
instance f by defining S = A U B U D. Each element of S retains its entire 
preference list from I as the first k 2 preference items in f. We refer to these 
k2 items as inherited items. All remaining items are inconsequential in f and are 
arranged in fixed but arbitrary permutations following the inherited items. The 
result is illustrated in Figure 4. 
Theorem 4: 
3PSA is NP-complete. 
Proof: Any stable marriage M m I is an assignment in I. Any destabilizing 
triple for Min I is simultaneously a destabilizing triple for Min f. Therefore, the 
stability of M in I implies its stability in f. 
We claim that any stable assignment M in f involves only inherited items and is 
therefore a marriage in I. This is equivalent to claiming that M is a complete 
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ai 
a2 Copy 
preferences from I 
ak 
~-----------------
b1 
s b2 Copy II Rem preferences from I 
bk 
------------------
di 
d2 Copy 
preferences from I 
dk 
Figure 4. Preferences in the 3PSA instance i. 
matching of A x B x D. Otherwise, there exist elements ai E A, bj E B, d1 E D not 
matched to inherited items, which implies that aibjdl is a destabilizing triple. 
Since M involves only inherited items, any destabilizing triple for M in i 1s 
simultaneously a destabilizing triple for M in I. Therefore, the stability of M 
in i implies its stability in I. I 
Applications 
In addition to the interest generated amongst computer scientists, the stable mar-
riage problem has also received substantial attention from game theorists. It is used 
to model economic problems that require matching representatives from different 
market forces, such as matching labor to the job market. Since 1951, an algorithm 
that solves the stable marriage problem has been the basis for the success of NRMP, 
the centralized national program that matches medical school graduates to hospital 
resident positions [Ro84]. 
In recent years, NRMP administrators have recognized that, increasingly, medical 
schools are graduating married couples in the same year. In 1983, they instituted a 
"couples program" which allows a participating couple to increase the probability 
of their being matched with two positions in close proximity. To participate in this 
11 
special program, a couple submits a combined preference list that ranks pairs of 
resident positions. 
We now apply the analysis of this paper to two problems involving dual-career 
couples, one of which models exactly the NRMP matching program involving 
couples. 
Our first problem, the dual-career job matching problem (or DCJM for short), 
involves k couples seeking careers in two disjoint job markets. The couples are 
represented by the set A = { ai I 1 :::; i :::; k}. Two sets of k employers, each with a 
single job offer, are represented by B = {bi I 1 :::; i :::; k} and D = {di I 1 :::; i :::; k }. 
We retain the 2:: notation for preferences. In this case, ai 's preference remains a 
linear order on the elements of Bx D. However, bi's and di's preferences are linear 
orders involving only elements of A. This simplification is due to the absence of 
direct interaction between Band D; for each couple, employers in B offer jobs only 
to one member while employers in D offer jobs only to the other member. 
A job assignment Min DCJM is a complete matching of the sets A, B, and D. A 
destabilizing triple for Mis a triple abd tj. M such that, a's employers in Mare f318i, 
b employs a1, d employs a2, and the conditions (i) bd 2::a /3181, (ii) a 2::b a1, and 
(iii) a 2::d a2 are satisfied. Note that 2::b or 2::d may represent equality when a= a1 
(which implies b = /31) or a= a2 (d = 81), but not both. A stable job assignment 
is a job assignment in which no destabilizing triple exists. 
We now prove that deciding whether an instance of DCJM has a stable job assign-
ment is NP-complete. The proof mirrors that for 3GSM-by giving a polynomial 
transformation of a 3DM instance I' to a DCJM instance I. We begin by con-
structing a new frame tailored to the current problem, which requires three new 
elements for each of the sets A, B, and D. Their preferences are displayed in 
Figure 5. 
In Lemma 2, we actually proved a stronger result than is required for subsequent 
uses of the lemma. For the DCJM frame, the only property we need is that any 
stable job assignment must contain a1 /3181. This property is sufficient to validate, 
in the preferences of A's remaining elements, that (3181 is the boundary separating 
items that yield stable matches from those that yield unstable matches. 
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0'.1 /3181 (3382 /3283 II Rem 
0'.2 /3282 (3383 II Rem 
0'.3 (3383 II Rem 
/31 II Rem 0'.1 
/32 0'.1 0'.2 II Rem 
(33 0'.1 0'.2 II Rem 
81 II Rem 0'.1 
82 0'.2 0'.1 II Rem 
83 0'.2 a1 II Rem 
Figure 5. Preferences of the frame elements for DCJM. 
Lemma 4: 
If a stable job assignment M exists for I constructed by extending the frame in 
Figure 5, then a1f3181 E M. 
Proof: Suppose a1f3181 rf_ M. We prove the following assertions (a)-( d) in succes-
sion, resulting in a contradiction. 
a) a1f3382 rf_ M. Otherwise, /32 's employee 1s not a1. Hence, a2f3282 1s a 
destabilizing triple. 
b) a1/h83 rf_ M. Otherwise, /32's employee is a1, which implies that a2f3282 rf_ M 
and (33 's employee is not a1. Hence, a2f3383 is a destabilizing triple. 
c) 82's employee is a2. Otherwise, 82's employee is not a2. Hence, a1f3382, which 
is not in M by assertion (a), is a destabilizing triple. 
d) 82's employee is not a2. Otherwise, 83's employee is not a2. Hence, a1f3283, 
which is not in M by assertion (b ), is a destabilizing triple. 
Statements ( c) and ( d) contradict each other. I 
ai[l] I WajXai YajZaj 
ai[2] I WajXaj YajZai 
ai[3] I WajXaj YajZaj 
ai[3] 
ai [3] 
ai [2] 
ai[2] 
II Rem 
ai[2] 
ai [2] 
II Rem 
ai[3] 
ai[3] 
II Rem 
II Rem 
II Rem 
II Rem 
II Rem 
II Rem 
II Rem 
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Figure 6. Preferences of the DCJM instance I. The column of (3181 's 
represents the boundary. 
With minor modifications, the construction of 3GSM illustrated in Figure 3 is 
adapted to work for DCJM. The resulting DCJM instance I, shown in Figure 6, is 
obtained from Figure 3 by removing the second component in Wai, Xai, Yai, and Zai 's 
first three preference choices (only these choices are relevant). 
Theorem 5: 
DCJM is NP-complete. 
Proof: Suppose I has a stable job assignment. We claim a result identical to 
Lemma 3, although the differences between 3GSM and DCJM require a technical 
adjustment in the proof. It remains valid that Xai must match with one of its first 
three preference choices. In Lemma 3, the Wai component in these three preference 
choices places Wai in Xai 's match automatically. This is no longer guaranteed in 
the present case. To patch the proof, we observe that matching an ai clone with 
Xai, but not Wai, yields a destabilizing triple immediately because the ai clone 
is matched with an item located right of the boundary. Hence, one of the three 
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ai clones must match with WaiXai. Extending the same argument to Yai and Zai 
proves that a second ai clone must match with Yai Zai. 
The proof in Theorem 2 now follows. For each ai E A', the remaining ai clone 
must match with its third preference item because this is the only unmatched item 
located left of the boundary. The job assignment that results from matching the 
remaining ai clone, for all ai E A', corresponds to a complete matching contained 
in T'. Hence, if the DCJM instance I has a stable job assignment, then T' contains 
a complete matching of I'. 
Conversely, if T' contains a complete matching, we can find a stable job assignment 
by applying the technique of Theorem 1 to the DCJM instance I. In this case, 
a1f3181, a2f3282, and a.3{3383 are the assignments in the frame. For each ai E A', 
an ai clone is matched with a pair in B x D such that the resulting triple is in T'. 
We can always find such a pair among those preference items located left of the 
boundary. The remaining ai clones are matched with Wai Xai and Yai Zai. The job 
assignment that results is stable. I 
We now turn our attention to the problem involving couples such that both mem-
bers are seeking employment in the same job market. The dual-career single job 
market matching problem (or DCSJMM for short) models exactly a matching prob-
lem handled annually by NRMP since 1983, when it first permitted couples to rank 
pairs of hospital resident positions. 
In a case study on NRMP's role in the medical resident labor market, Roth calls 
attention to a potentially serious problem with NRMP's "couples program" [Ro84]. 
Roth gave an example involving four hospitals and two couples and demonstrated 
that no stable job assignment exists for the given example [Ro84, p 1008]. We will 
show, from the perspective of computational complexity, that the problem is more 
serious than Roth had envisioned. Specifically, we show that deciding whether a 
DCSJMM instance has a stable job assignment is NP-complete. It follows that, 
even if a DCSJMM instance I has a stable job assignment, it is unlikely an efficient 
algorithm that finds it exists. Otherwise, we can execute the algorithm on I, and 
in polynomial time check the outcome for stability, 2 thus deciding if I has a stable 
job assignment. 
2 The polynomial time bound follows from DCSJMM's membership in NP, a property that is easy 
to verify. 
I 
J 
15 
An instance of DCSJMM involves k couples represented by the set C = {Ci l 1 ::; 
i ::; k} and 2k employers, each with a single job offer, represented by the set 
S = {Si I 1 :::; i ::; 2k }. Each Ci = fimi, where fi and mi are the female and male 
members of Ci respectively: Preferences of C's elements are linear orders on the set 
of ordered pairs {siSj Ii =f. j and Si,Sj ES}. The pair SiSj is ordered such that 
fi 's potential employer is listed first. Preferences of S's elements are linear orders 
on the set {fi,m1,/2,m2, ... ,fbmk}. 
A job assignment Mis a set of triples { CSiSj I c = fm E C; Si, Sj E S; i =J. j} such 
that each element of C and S appears exactly once in M. Note that CSiS j E M 
implies that Si employs f and s j employs m. A destabilizing triple for M is a triple 
CSiSj (j. M, c = fm E C; Si, Sj E S; i =/:- j; such that, e's employers in M are aia2, 
Si employs {1, Sj employs 12; and the conditions (i) SiSj 2'.:c aia2, (ii) f 2'.:si lb and 
(iii) m 2'.:sj 12 are satisfied. A stable job assignment is a job assignment in which 
no destabilizing triple exists. 
We apply the same technique used in the NP-completeness proof of 3PSA to 
prove that DCSJMM is NP-complete. Given a DCJM instance I where A = 
{a1, a2, ... , ak}, B = {b1, b2, ... , bk}, and D = {di, d2, ... , dk}; we extend it into 
the D CSJMM instance f shown in Figure 7. In f, C = A and S = B U D. The first 
k2 preference items of C's elements and the first k preference items of S's elements 
are inherited from I with the exact ordering retained. For those elements of S th~t 
originate from B, an inherited preference i tern ai is further changed to fi to reflect 
B's strict policy in I of hiring only a couple's female member. Similarly, elements 
that originate from D modify ai to mi. All remaining items are inconsequential 
in f and are arranged in fixed but arbitrary permutations following the inherited 
items. 
Theorem 6: 
DCSJMM is NP-complete. 
Proof: Any stable job assignment M in I is a job assignment in f. Any destabiliz-
ing triple for Min I is simultaneously a destabilizing triple for Min f. Therefore, 
the stability of M in I implies its stability in f. 
We claim that any stable assignment M in f consists entirely of matches that 
involve only inherited items. Otherwise, there exists elements ai E A, bj E B, 
16 
r =fim1 EJ C a2 = hm.2 Copy preferences from I ak = fkmk 
b1 
b2 Replace ai with fi 
after copying 
bk preferences from I 
s ~---------------- II Rem 
di Replace ai with mi 
d2 after copying 
preferences from I 
dk 
Figure 7. Preferences in the DCSJMM instance i. 
and dz E D that are not matched to inherited items in M. In such cases, it is easy 
to verify that aibjdl is a destabilizing triple for M. 
Since M involves only inherited items, the stability of M in f implies its stability 
in I. I 
Conclusions 
We have shown that three dimensional generalizations of the stable marriage and 
stable roommate problems are NP-complete. Our result also applies to the prob-
lem of finding stable job assignments for dual-career couples. Such a problem is 
dealt with annually by NRMP, when it assigns couples who are both medical school 
graduates to hospital resident positions. We show that this assignment problem is 
NP-complete, and hence we cannot expect NRMP to have an efficient solution. 
It may be interesting, as a topic for further research, to investigate the possibility 
of applying our result to other matching problems and their variants. 
17 
REFERENCES 
[GJ79] GAREY, M. R. AND D. S. JOHNSON. Computers and intractability; a guide 
to the theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman & Co., New York, 
1979. 
[GS62] GALE, D. AND L. SHAPLEY. College admissions and the stability of 
marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69 (1962), 9-15. 
[Gu87] GusFIELD, D. Three fast algorithms for four. problems in stable marriage. 
SIAM J. Computing 16, 1 (1987), 111-128. 
[Gu88] GusFIELD, D. The structure of the stable roommate problem: efficient 
representation and enumeration of all stable assignments. SIAM J. Com-
puting 17, 4 (1988), 742-769. 
[IL86] IRVING, R. W. AND P. LEATHER. The complexity of counting stable 
marriages. SIAM J. Computing 15, 3 (1986), 655-667. 
[IR85] IRVING, R. W. An efficient algorithm for the "stable roommates" problem. 
J. Algorithms 6 (1985), 577-595. 
[KA 72] KARP, R. M. Reducibility among combinatorial problems. In Complexity 
of computer computations, R. E. Miller and J. W. Thatcher, Ed., Plenum 
Press, New York, pp. 85-103. 
[KN76] KNUTH, D. E. Mariages stables, Les Presses de L'Universite de Montreal, 
1976. 
[MW71] McVITIE, D. G. AND L.B. WILSON. The stable marriage problem. Comm. 
ACM 14 (1971), 486-492. 
[NH88] NG, C. AND D. S. HIRSCHBERG. Lower bounds for the stable marriage 
problem and its variants. Technical Report 88-18. Department of Infor-
mation and Computer Science, University of California, Irvine (1988). 
[Ro84] ROTH, A. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and 
residents: a case study in game theory. J. Political Economy 92 (1984), 
991-1016. 
